Shun Kurokawa

  1. Kurokawa, S. 2019. The role of generosity on the evolution of cooperation. Ecological Complexity 40:100778. (doi: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2019.100778)
  2. Kurokawa, S. 2019. Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option. Journal of Theoretical Biology 480:13–22. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.07.012)
  3. Kurokawa, S., X. Zheng, and Y. Tao. 2019. Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players. Applied Mathematics and Computation 350:209–216. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.12.043)
  4. Kurokawa, S. 2019. How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence. Applied Mathematics and Computation 341:174–192. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.08.050)
  5. Kurokawa, S., J.Y. Wakano, and Y. Ihara. 2018. Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions. Games 9:100 (doi: 10.3390/g9040100)
  6. Kurokawa, S. 2018. The occasional absence of resources for cooperation and its role in the evolution of direct reciprocity. Ecological Complexity 36:196–205. (doi: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2018.08.007)
  7. Fukutomi, M. and S. Kurokawa. 2018. How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection? Applied Mathematics and Computation 336:301–314. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.05.010) (†corresponding author)
  8. Kurokawa, S. 2017. Generalized Version of the One-third Law. Research & Reviews: Journal of Zoological Sciences (http://www.rroij.com/open-access/generalized-version-of-the-onethird-law-.pdf)
  9. Kurokawa, S. 2017. The Stability for Tit-for-Tat. Research & Reviews:Journal of Zoological Sciences (http://www.rroij.com/open-access/the-stability-for-titfortat-.pdf)
  10. Kurokawa, S. 2017. Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? Mathematical Biosciences 289:20–28. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.04.002)
  11. Kurokawa, S. 2017. The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence. Journal of Theoretical Biology 421:16–27. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021)
  12. Wang, S-C., J-R. Yu, S. Kurokawa, and Y. Tao. 2017. Imitation dynamics with time delay. Journal of Theoretical Biology 420:8–11. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.034)
  13. Kurokawa, S. 2017. Persistence extends reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences 286:94–103. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006)
  14. Kurokawa, S. and Y. Ihara. 2017. Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient? Journal of Theoretical Biology 415:20–31. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002)
  15. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators. Mathematical Biosciences 282:16–20. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.09.012)
  16. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science 7:5–8. (doi: 10.5178/lebs.2016.51)
  17. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Evolutionary stagnation of reciprocators. Animal Behaviour 122:217–225. (doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.09.014)
  18. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences 279:63–70. (doi:10.1016/j.mbs.2016.07.004)
  19. Li, X., S. Kurokawa, S. Giaimo, and A. Traulsen. 2016. How life history can sway the fixation probability of mutants. Genetics 203:1297–1313. (doi: 10.1534/genetics.116.188409)
  20. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences 276:114–120. (doi: 10.1016j.mbs.2016.03.011)
  21. Kurokawa, S. 2016. Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity? Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science 7:14–16. (doi: 10.5178/lebs.2016.43)
  22. Kurokawa, S. and Y. Ihara. 2013. Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general n-player games and its implications. Theoretical Population Biology 84:1–8. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004)
  23. Deng, K., Z. Li, S. Kurokawa, and T. Chu. 2012. Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation. Theoretical Population Biology 81:284–291. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005)
  24. Kurokawa, S., J.Y. Wakano, and Y. Ihara. 2010. Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors. Theoretical Population Biology 77:257–262. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002)
  25. Kurokawa, S., and Y. Ihara. 2009. Emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 276:1379–1384. (doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1546)

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