# Shun Kurokawa

### About Shun

I am a postdoctoral scientist in the Shefferson lab at the University of Tokyo. I study evolutionary ecology, and prior to joining this group focused on theoretical aspects of the evolution of human behavior using evolutionary game theory (e.g., Kurokawa and Ihara, 2009). In this group, I am planning to study vegetative dormancy, a cryptic stage in the life of many herbaceous plant species. Stage structured population analyses (which are often more complicated than age structured population analyses) can help us in studying vegetative dormancy, and I would like to enjoy discovering what can happen in such populations. I would also like to determine whether vegetative dormancy is adaptive or maladaptive, and in what ways vegetative dormancy is adaptive if so.

### Publications

**Kurokawa, S.**2019. The role of generosity on the evolution of cooperation.*Ecological Complexity*40:100778. (doi: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2019.100778)**Kurokawa, S.**2019. Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option.*Journal of Theoretical Biology*480:13–22. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.07.012)**Kurokawa, S.**, X. Zheng, and Y. Tao. 2019. Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players.*Applied Mathematics and Computation*350:209–216. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.12.043)**Kurokawa, S.**2019. How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence.*Applied Mathematics and Computation*341:174–192. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.08.050)**Kurokawa, S.**, J.Y. Wakano, and Y. Ihara. 2018. Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions.*Games*9:100 (doi: 10.3390/g9040100)**Kurokawa, S.**2018. The occasional absence of resources for cooperation and its role in the evolution of direct reciprocity.*Ecological Complexity*36:196–205. (doi: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2018.08.007)- Fukutomi, M. and
**S. Kurokawa**. 2018. How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?*Applied Mathematics and Computation*336:301–314. (doi: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.05.010) (†corresponding author) **Kurokawa, S.**2017. Generalized Version of the One-third Law.*Research & Reviews: Journal of Zoological Sciences*(http://www.rroij.com/open-access/generalized-version-of-the-onethird-law-.pdf)**Kurokawa, S.**2017. The Stability for Tit-for-Tat.*Research & Reviews:Journal of Zoological Sciences*(http://www.rroij.com/open-access/the-stability-for-titfortat-.pdf)**Kurokawa, S.**2017. Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?*Mathematical Biosciences*289:20–28. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.04.002)**Kurokawa, S.**2017. The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence.*Journal of Theoretical Biology*421:16–27. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021)- Wang, S-C., J-R. Yu,
**S. Kurokawa**, and Y. Tao. 2017. Imitation dynamics with time delay.*Journal of Theoretical Biology*420:8–11. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.034) **Kurokawa, S.**2017. Persistence extends reciprocity.*Mathematical Biosciences*286:94–103. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006)**Kurokawa, S.**and Y. Ihara. 2017. Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?*Journal of Theoretical Biology*415:20–31. (doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002)**Kurokawa, S.**2016. Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators.*Mathematical Biosciences*282:16–20. (doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.09.012)**Kurokawa, S.**2016. Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost.*Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science*7:5–8. (doi: 10.5178/lebs.2016.51)**Kurokawa, S.**2016. Evolutionary stagnation of reciprocators.*Animal Behaviour*122:217–225. (doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.09.014)**Kurokawa, S.**2016. Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity.*Mathematical Biosciences*279:63–70. (doi:10.1016/j.mbs.2016.07.004)- Li, X.,
**S. Kurokawa**, S. Giaimo, and A. Traulsen. 2016. How life history can sway the fixation probability of mutants.*Genetics*203:1297–1313. (doi: 10.1534/genetics.116.188409) **Kurokawa, S.**2016. Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity.*Mathematical Biosciences*276:114–120. (doi: 10.1016j.mbs.2016.03.011)**Kurokawa, S.**2016. Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity?*Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science*7:14–16. (doi: 10.5178/lebs.2016.43)**Kurokawa, S.**and Y. Ihara. 2013. Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general n-player games and its implications.*Theoretical Population Biology*84:1–8. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004)- Deng, K., Z. Li,
**S. Kurokawa**, and T. Chu. 2012. Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation.*Theoretical Population Biology*81:284–291. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005) **Kurokawa, S.**, J.Y. Wakano, and Y. Ihara. 2010. Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors.*Theoretical Population Biology*77:257–262. (doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002)**Kurokawa, S.**, and Y. Ihara. 2009. Emergence of cooperation in public goods games.*Proceedings of the Royal Society B*276:1379–1384. (doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1546)